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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper, I will reflect upon Aristotle’s argument claiming that the function of a human being is to 
engage in activity of soul in accord with reason (AWR).  I will explicate and further defend this 
argument, which is based on the fact that the function of X must characterize it as an X and set a standard 
for X’s impairment and excellence, and the only candidates for a human’s function are: to take in 
nutrients and grow, to perceive and move, and to engage in activities of soul in accord with reason.  I will 
raise the objection that having a continuous sense of self (CSOS) in addition AWR is a relevant candidate 
for a human’s function that Aristotle did not consider.  I will define CSOS as involving being aware of 
and being able to understand one’s own emotions, beliefs, identities, relationships, and experiences at a 
given time that are relevant to the answering of some question at hand.  I will then show that by 
discounting CSOS as a candidate for characterizing a human being, past what is needed for AWR and 
considered as separate from AWR, we would be missing a crucial element of what defines a human. 
 
 
 
 
In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics,1 Aristotle claims that the function of a human 
being is to engage in activity of soul in accord with reason (AWR)2.  In this paper, I 
will first state this claim, then state and explicate Aristotle’s argument in support of this 
claim.  This argument is based on the fact that the function of X must characterize it as 
an X and set a standard for X’s impairment and excellence, and the only candidates for 
a human’s function are: to take in nutrients and grow, to perceive and move, and to 
engage in activities of soul in accord with reason.  Since taking in nutrients and 
growing is a living thing’s function, and since perceiving and moving is an animal’s 
function, the only candidate that is left, and therefore must be a human’s function, is 
AWR.  I will raise the objection that having a continuous sense of self (CSOS) in 
addition to AWR is a relevant candidate Aristotle did not consider.  Then, I will make a 
reply on behalf of Aristotle, with problematic implications, that a CSOS plus AWR 
                                                          
1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. Rowe, ed. S. Broadie (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
2 Aristotle 1098a7. 
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cannot be the function of a human because it does not set an appropriate standard for 
success and impairment.  
 
In his function argument, Aristotle claims that the function of a human being is to 
engage in activity of soul in accord with reason.3  By soul, he means something that 
characterizes an organism as “alive” or a characteristic all living things have.  With “in 
accord with reason,” Aristotle is encompassing: theoretical reasoning— reasoning 
about what is true and false, utilizing the concept “true;” practical reasoning— 
reasoning about what is good to do using the concept “good;” emotion shaped 
(restrained or intensified) by practical reasoning; and action on behalf of practical 
reasoning (reasoning that something is good to do and so doing it).  Practical reasoning 
also requires a commitment to the correctness of the judgment used to determine 
something as “good”4 which requires  1.) a recognition, using the concept “true,” that 
the lack of such an evaluative judgment of something as good or bad would be a 
mistake5 and 2.) a recognition of the need to justify the evaluative judgment.6  Thus, 
Aristotle claims that what characterizes humans uniquely, and what sets the standard 
for impairment or excellence, is their ability to do acts characteristic of living things, in 
keeping with a human’s ability to reason (both practically and theoretically), and to be 
directed by reason, either by acting or having shaping emotions based on reason.   
 
He supports this claim with the following premises: 
 
1. The function of an F characterizes it as an F rather than any other 
kind of thing7 and sets the standard for what counts as impairment 
and excellence8 in Fs. 
2. The only relevant candidates for the human function are: to take in 
nutrients and grow,9 to perceive10 and move, and to engage in 
activities of soul in accord with reason.11 
3. Taking in nutrients and growing characterizes something as alive12 
4. Perceiving and moving characterizes something as animal13 
5. A human being is not merely alive or merely an animal 
                                                          
3 Aristotle 1098a7. 
4 Agnieszka Jaworska,  “Moral Psychology in Practice: Lessons from Alzheimer’s Disease and 
the “Terrible Twos,” 23, 30. 
5 Jaworska 26, 30, 31. 
6 Jaworska 28, 31. 
7 Aristotle 1098a1. 
8 Aristotle 1097b27 
9 Aristotle 1098a2 
10 Aristotle 1098a3 
11 Aristotle 1098a7 
12 Aristotle 1097b35 
13 Aristotle 1098a3 
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6. So, taking in nutrients, growing, perceiving, and moving is not the 
function of a human being. 
Conclusion. So, to engage in activity of the soul in accord with reason is 
the function of a human being. 
 
In premise 1, the definition of a “function” is introduced.  The function of an F allows 
one to include or exclude objects in the category of F, based on if those objects can 
serve that function.  It also allows one to determine that an object belongs to that 
particular category, as opposed to any other category, and provides information like the 
material and shape of the object.  This function is based in 1st actuality, meaning an 
object has the ability to do something.  For example, a shovel has the ability to dig.  
This is its function, even if it is not currently digging at the moment (which would be 
2nd actuality).  All shovels can dig and anything that can dig is a shovel.  The function 
of a type of object also sets up the standard of what it is to function well and what it is 
to function badly, by giving a baseline of what an F ought to be able to do, and thus 
allowing a source of evaluation of an object as an F to occur.  If the object is not 
meeting the standard, or in other words, is not able to function the way it should, it 
allows one to identify that object as impaired or not fully formed.  This depends on if 
the object is in the process of becoming an F (then, not fully-formed) or if the object 
has regressed from being able to act as an F (then, impaired).  If the object is exceeding 
this standard by doing its function well, it is excellent.  If a shovel cannot dig, it is 
impaired or not fully formed.  If a shovel digs well, it is an excellent shovel. 
 
Premise two can be defended in that to take in nutrients and grow, to perceive and 
move, and to engage in activities of soul in accord with reason are all candidates 
because by observation, one can see that all human beings do these activities.  Humans 
eat and grow, they use their senses or take in their surroundings and move accordingly, 
and they exhibit activity in accord with reason, as human beings reason about what is 
true and false, what is “good” and good to do, and act or emote with influence from 
reasoning.  These are relevant candidates in identifying the function of a human being, 
because they can set the standard for whether or not a human is meeting his/ her 
function.  If a human cannot do one of these things, we typically think there is 
something wrong, which implies that the human is falling short of some standard that 
all human beings typically meet, or some function that all human beings typically have.   
 
For premise 3, I will define growing as: an overall extension of a collective being that 
would respond to the removal of any piece of itself that it has grown, and taking in 
nutrients as: an intake of external resources.  This premise can be defended by the fact 
that all living things take in nutrients and do this kind of growing, from trees, to horses, 
to human beings.  If a living things such as a tree, horse, or human could not do this, 
possibly because they could no longer break down or ingest nutrients and direct them 
towards growing, they would be considered impaired. Furthermore, things that are not 
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alive do not take in nutrients and grow, like rocks and dirt, demonstrating it is a 
characteristic of living things only.  Thus, since one could determine that something is 
living due to the fact that it is taking in nutrients and growing, one can say this is the 
function of living things. 
 
To defend premise 4, I will define perceiving as taking in external stimuli through the 
senses and moving as a change in position of body and/or location.  This is something 
all animals do, as all animals must do this in order to survive.  Bears do this, cows do 
this, foxes do this, and all the other members of the animal kingdom do this.  If an 
animal did not move or perceive, we would consider that animal either not fully 
developed or impaired- a bear that was blind or paralyzed would be considered 
impaired.  Furthermore, organisms that are not animals do not do this, like fungi and 
plants, demonstrating this is a characteristic defining of animals only.  Thus, since one 
could determine that something is an animal due to the fact that it is perceiving and 
moving, one can say that this the function of animals. 
 
To defend premise 5, one can see how humans could not be classified as merely an 
animal or as alive.  It is a more specific category that not all animals and not all living 
things can fall under.  There is something else shared in humans that sets them apart 
from other animals and living things.  One could look at a sample of living things or of 
animals and be able to pick out the humans within the sample, because something else 
characterizes a human specifically as not just being an animal or living thing.  
 
This leads to premise 6, because the function of a human cannot be to take in nutrients 
and grow, because that is the function of a living thing, and it cannot be to perceive and 
move, because that is the function of an animal, and the function of one thing cannot 
characterize two different things. 
 
Now, I will offer an objection by claiming there is another relevant candidate for the 
human function that is not included in Aristotle’s list of “the only relevant candidates” 
in premise 2.  This relevant candidate is to engage in activity of soul in accord with 
reason, and with a continuous sense of self.   
 
I will support this objection using the following premises: 
 
I. A sense of self (SOS) involves being aware of and being able to 
understand one’s own emotions, beliefs, identities, relationships, and 
experiences at a given time that are relevant to the answering of 
some question at hand. 
II. A continuous sense of self (CSOS) involves all that is needed for a sense 
of self plus having the ability to connect one’s past and present self, 
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through remembering one’s past relationships, and what one has 
believed, emoted, identified as, and experienced in the past. 
III. A CSOS is needed for AWR. 
IV. But, even if one has a CSOS to the extent needed for AWR, a CSOS still 
has its own standard of what it is to do well, independent of what it 
is to do AWR well.  
V. Thus, a CSOS is different from AWR. 
VI. All humans can have a CSOS if fully formed and not impaired. 
VII. And, a CSOS can set the appropriate standard for disability and 
success. 
VIII. Non-humans cannot have a CSOS, so a CSOS can characterize 
something as human. 
Conclusion.  Therefore, to engage in activity of the soul in accord with 
reason and with a continuous sense of self is a relevant candidate for the 
function of a human being that Aristotle did not include. 
 
To further explicate premise 1, I will use an example case to give a better picture of 
what a sense of self is.  If one were to suddenly feel consumed by anger at another 
person, the question one might desire to answer at that given point in time is, “Why am 
I, person X, angry at person Y right now?”  Then, X would try to become aware of and 
understand any emotions, beliefs, identities, relationships, and experiences that may be 
relevant to answering this question.  For instance, the relevant emotion would be anger, 
and being aware of this anger’s degree can help X find out what the logical source is.  
X could also consider any relevant identities, that is, any personality traits or labels X 
uses to describe him/herself.  Maybe X knows him/herself to be very hot-tempered, 
especially in regards to punctuality.  And then, X might think on his/her beliefs, that is, 
what X believes to be true and false in the world.   Maybe X thinks it to be true that it is 
a sign of disrespect if someone arrives late.  And, X might take into consideration that 
his/her relationship to Y is one of a spouse.  And, from drawing on relevant past 
experiences, X might recall that Y is always making X wait and Y just arrived late just 
now.  Now, X can answer why he/ she is angry.  X could also ask, “What is the best 
action for me to enact right now?” or “How do I feel about this situation?” or other 
questions and use the same method. 
 
To explicate premise 2, I will define being able to connect one’s past and present self as 
involving the recollection of one’s past relationships, emotions, beliefs, identities, and 
experiences in the past, and using this information to tie one’s past self and present self 
together as one and the same person. 
 
To explicate premise 3, in AWR, one needs to reason, and to reason, one needs at least 
enough of a CSOS to hold onto what one believes, feels, identifies, has a relationship 
to, and emotes (as all can go into making a reasoned judgment) through the time needed 
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to deliberate.  Many decisions about what is true, good, good to do, and emotions that 
are good to shape, take longer than a moment to reason through and make, and one 
must have a CSOS long enough to get through the whole reasoning process and also 
through executing the action and shaping the emotion (if necessary) in order to be able 
to have practical reasoning, theoretical reasoning, actions based on practical reasoning, 
and emotions shaped by practical reasoning. 
 
Premise 4 could be defended by the fact that one could still do AWR, that is, one can 
have enough of a CSOS to succeed at AWR, but have an impaired CSOS.  To succeed 
at AWR, all one really needs are small chunks of a CSOS, long enough to carry out 
deliberation, and those chunks could even be completely discontinuous with one 
another, indicating an impaired CSOS.  Thus, the standard of succeeding at AWR and 
CSOS is different.  In order to succeed in having a CSOS, one must at the very 
minimum be able to connect one’s sense of self from one’s past deliberation to the 
unrelated deliberation immediately following, let alone be able to connect one’s self 
from 10 years ago to one’s present self, but succeeding at AWR does not even require 
this minimum.   
 
Thus, premise 5 follows, as succeeding in AWR does not necessarily entail succeeding 
in having a CSOS, which it should if they are the same thing. 
 
To defend premise 6, I will present a case study of a human subject, NN, age 39, who 
suffered trauma resulting in retrograde amnesia.14  This retrograde amnesia made it so 
that he could not remember anything from his own personal past, though he could still 
remember things external from himself, like facts about public events, and still had the 
implicit skills he had developed earlier.  Thus, the only damage that NN sustained was 
his ability to connect his past self to his present self, as he had no way to link between 
the two.  He could still reason using these external facts and implicit skills he still 
retained, he just did not have a CSOS.15  Intuitively, we would call NN’s inability to 
remember his past self and connect it to his present self an impairment in a fully-
formed human, and indeed, if this lack of CSOS were not an unusual case, researchers 
would not have written a case study about it.  So, it must be true that ordinarily, in 
humans who are not impaired and are fully formed, humans should be able to have a 
CSOS. 
 
To defend premise 7, I will show how a CSOS can set the standard for impairment and 
success that falls in line with intuitive declarations.  For example, if one were to be 
                                                          
14 K. Henning-Fast, F. Meister, T. Frodl, A Beraldi, F. Padberg, R. Engel, M. Reiser, H. Moller, 
and T. Meindl, “A Case of Persistent Retrograde Amnesia Following a Dissociative Fugue: 
Neuropsychological and Neurofunctional Underpinings of Loss of Autobiographical Memory 
and Self-Awareness,” Neuropsychologia 46 (2008): 2993-3005. 
15 Henning-Fast et al. 2995 
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missing a 5 year chunk of one’s life where one could not recall a single relevant (to a 
present question) emotion, belief, identity, relationship, or experience that one held in 
that period of time, we would intuitively call that person impaired.  We would also call 
that person impaired against the standard set by CSOS, because there is a huge 
discontinuity that would make it difficult for one to connect one’s past self with one’s 
present self.  Or, if someone were to fail in just having a sense of self, in other words, if 
one were not aware of or could not understand relevant emotions, beliefs, identities, 
relationships, and experiences at a given time, we would intuitively call that person 
impaired, and as that person is impaired in just having a SOS, let alone a CSOS, the 
standard would also judge them to be impaired as well.  However, if there were a 
person who could continuously trace back a connection from his/her present self all the 
way back to their early years, albeit noticing changes in their self over the course of 
time, and could understand one’s relevant emotions, beliefs, identities, relationships, 
and experiences at a given time well and answer the relevant question well, we would 
intuitively say that the person is succeeding, or doing well, above just the normal 
person.  And, according to the standard set by a CSOS, that person would be judged as 
succeeding as well. 
 
To defend premise 8, I will refer to the fact that although the ability to recognize one’s 
self, as demonstrated by being able to recognize one’s self in the mirror, does indicate a 
sort of rudimentary sense of self, it is does not meet the standards needed for a CSOS or 
even a complete SOS.  This ability for mirror self-recognition (MSR) has been found in 
great apes, chimpanzees, monkeys, lesser apes, elephants, African gray parrots,16 
dolphins,17 and magpies,18 but MSR in animals is the equivalent of a toddler 
recognizing him or herself in the mirror. MSR emerges around “18-24 months of age 
and marks the beginning of a developmental process of achieving increasingly abstract 
psychological levels of self-awareness, including introspection and mental state 
attribution.”19  Thus, even if animals exhibit MSR, it may be the first step in exhibiting 
a more complete and complex SOS, but it is just that- the first step.  It is by no means 
the whole ability.  Furthermore, the fact that it is analogous to a toddler’s developing 
SOS proves that this is not the equivalent of even a fully developed SOS that humans 
exhibit.  One would hardly consider a toddler’s SOS close to meeting the standard, let 
alone excelling at it.  And, “autobiographical memory relies on complex interactions 
between different memory systems… and on a sense of self-continuity over the course 
of one’s life”20 and this “ability to vividly re-experience autobiographical memories is 
                                                          
16 Diana Reiss and Lori Marino, “Mirror Self-Recognition in the Bottlenose Dolphin: A Case of 
Cognitive Convergence,” National Academy of Sciences 98 (2001): 5937. 
17 Diana Reiss and Lori Marino 5942. 
18 Bruce Bower, “Magpies Check Themselves Out: Reactions to Mirror Image Suggest Self-
Recognition,” Society for Science & the Public 174 (2008): 10.  
19 Diana Reiss and Lori Marino 5937. 
20 Henning-Fast et al. 2993 
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thought to be unique to humans”21 since “the autobiographical self relies on linguistic 
abilities that only humans possess.”22  Thus, animals not only do not have a full SOS 
needed for a CSOS, they also do not have the cognitive skills required for this 
connecting of past and present self. Then, the conclusion of the objection follows. 
 
Aristotle might reply that the objection is based on a false claim in premise 7.    He 
might ask, how continuous does one’s CSOS have to be and how far in the past does it 
have to extend to in order to meet the standard?  As this standard is not clear, he might 
argue that a CSOS might set the standard for non-impairment to be able to connect 
every single day in your past from birth to present.  This would then set an 
inappropriate standard for success and impairment, contrary to objection premise 7’s 
claim, because this standard would declare people to be impaired when we would not 
intuitively call them impaired.  So, the only way one could save the heart of this 
argument would be if one were to limit CSOS to something more feasible— for 
example, by judging one’s CSOS by one’s ability to engage in AWR.  But then, CSOS 
would be limited to exactly AWR, and thus would be no different from AWR. 
 
However, this reply has problematic implications.  If we did not take into account a 
person’s CSOS in characterizing them as a human being, past what is needed for AWR 
and considered as separate from AWR, we would be missing a crucial element of the 
human experience.  By limiting the amount of CSOS that one needs to only AWR, this 
reply implies that we are not missing anything if we cannot feel connected to our past 
selves past making a decision.  And, by limiting the good of CSOS as only in aiding in 
AWR, this discounts other things a CSOS is good for, or its goodness for its own sake.  
Without CSOS, there is much one can feel like one is missing if one cannot remember 
the emotions, beliefs, relationships, and experiences one held in the past.  Tracing the 
influence of the past on our present selves, recalling all one has been through, and 
seeing how far one has come and developed as a person are all goods one would be 
deprived of without a true CSOS, separate from and greater than just AWR. 
 
The main claim that was explored in this paper was Aristotle’s argument that the 
function of a human being is to engage in activity of the soul in accord with reason 
(AWR).  I objected to this by raising another relevant candidate, AWR with a 
continuous sense of self, which Aristotle excluded.  I then replied on Aristotle’s behalf 
by claiming that the standard set by CSOS is one that is not appropriate for determining 
impairment and success in humans.  I explored the implications of this reply by 
showing how if one were limited to just evaluating CSOS in terms of AWR, then one 
would be discounting all of the things CSOS outside of AWR can provide.  The next 
question that should be explored is why we feel the need to have a sense of our selves 
and our place in the world, not just why we are capable of it, but why we desire this 
                                                          
21 Henning-Fast et al. 2993 
22 Uwe Herwig, “Me, Myself, and I,” Scientific American Mind 21 (2010): 61. 
Res Cogitans (2016) 7                                                                                                                Han | 155 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
kind of knowledge.  If we are able to discover the answer to that question, we will have 
a greater understanding of what exactly is at stake in our endeavor to answer these 
questions.   
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